The space shuttle discovery is expected to return to Earth today, having retrieved the last U.S. astronaut to be stationed on the Russian space station Mir. With Mir in the rear view mirror of the US manned space program, it's time to assess the future of the troubled U.S. partnership with Russia to build the International Space Station.
By having astronauts on Mir, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration has learned much about the finer points of long-term continuous manned operations aboard space stations. Many things intended for use on the new station-- from procedures to actual hardware -- have been tested on Mir. And space workers at the Johnson Space Center in Houston have forged strong personal bonds with their opposite numbers in Russia. These are truly useful results.
NASA even puts a positive spin on the life-threatening crises last year, when crew members were threatened by flash fires, oxygen shortages, computer failures, and even a hole in the station's exterior which depressurized a section of the craft. NASA says such near-catastrophes taught it how to fix real problems with their Russian partners. But by admitting to the absence of such teamwork prior to this program, the agency is confessing that it took unprecedented risks when it put Americans on Mir in the first place.
Outside experts have long tried to warn NASA of the very problems that later caught it by surprise. But the corporate culture of the NASA management team prevented it from finding out many things faster, cheaper, and better than it would by blundering blindly into one crisis after another. Unless the agency more fully understands potential problems before any astronaut leaves the ground, the future space station will also teach lessons through hard knocks. That is one of the more sobering lessons of the three-year "marriage in the heavens" with the Russians.
. NASA remains tightly focused on the specific technical lessons learned from the Mir expeditions. This just sets up the space program for more unpleasant surprises. Most of what happened on Mir just can't happen on the new space station, scheduled for final assembly in 2003, since its technology is decades ahead of Mir's. This means that most of what WILL go wrong on the International Space Station will have no warning precursors aboard Mir. These potential new problems will have to be anticipated and prepared for through pure foresight -- using better hazard assessment techniques than those that failed for the Mir flights.
Throughout Mir's problems, Russian space workers were able to maintain the station and continued to launch new crews and new supply drones on schedule. The core "corporate knowledge" for the Russian space team lies in an experienced cadre of engineers hired from the Soviet Union's best universities at the dawn of the Space Age, 40 years ago. But during the last several years, the Russian teams have been decimated by loss of experienced personnel, as highly trained space workers either seek better-paying jobs elsewhere, or grow old and die. Few replacements have been recruited and trained, so the entire backbone of the Russian space team is crumbling.
While the Russians remain competent in repeating missions that have been flown for decades, they have been unable to inaugurate reliable new technologies and programs. Everything that works on Mir involves 20-year-old tricks. But a year ago, when a fundamentally new space docking profile was attempted, the result was a collision that punctured the station, crippling it and almost killing the crew. Other new Russian space vehicles -- most notably, the doomed Mars-96 probe and its plutonium batteries -- have also failed disastrously.
This does not augur well for the International Space Station, whose first U.S.-made component is scheduled for launch in November. Beyond this first module, which is based on a 20-year-old Russian design, the Russians have promised to develop a whole string of new and improved space vehicles to hook up to the ISS. But over the past several years, Russia's work on the new components has fallen far behind schedule, causing delays and cost overruns in the U.S. side of the work.
The major reason for Russia's inability to do its share for the ISS is that its space agency is critically short of funding from the Kremlin. Funding for Mir is fairly reliable, and one reason the Russians want to continue the program into next year is that foreign customers have already signed paying contracts for more "guest missions". And since the first ISS module, built in Russia, was funded by NASA, it too was delivered on time and up to the high standards of Soviet-era space flight.
But after years of Russian promises to guarantee adequate funding for the Russian portions of the ISS hardware, even the most optimistic NASA officials have recently confessed to being "naive" about Moscow's ability to meet its obligations. The cost of this naivité: Total expenses for the new station have soared to $24 billion in the most recent estimate, a price tag that threatens to render the program politically bankrupt in Congress.
As important as the components Moscow is expected to provide is the availability of the only launch site capable of handling the the Russian launchings to the new space station -- the Baykonur Cosmodrome. The problem is that the space center is located in the newly independent state of Kazakstan. Four years ago, Moscow signed a treaty promising to pay the Central Asian country $115 million a year in rent; NASA touted the agreement as solving forever the problem. But once again, Russia misled credulous NASA officials, and to date has never paid a kopeck to Kazakstan on the lease. Kazakstan responded by interrupting the water and electricity supplies to the base. Since then, Russia has signed new agreements with new promises -- but still has not paid any money.
During the shuttle-Mir missions, NASA personnel observed first-hand another feature of the Russian space program's financial debacle: corruption and embezzlement. Russian workers in Houston, for example, had to save their dollar-denominated per diem payments -- because their bosses back home demanded half the money as kickback. And while space officials get rich, ordinary workers on the program are paid less than taxi drivers, and receive their checks months late.
Meanwhile, NASA does not want to talk about the three story brick mansions built by top cosmonaut officials at the Star City training base near Moscow. "What Russia does with its own money is none of our business", a NASA spokesman told 'Nightline' last year. When one Russian general was confronted in Houston by a television news crew asking about how he could afford such a house on his official salary, NASA revoked the journalists' press passes.
The International Space Station can be derailed by many things, such as Moscow's inability to fund it adequately. But perhaps the greatest threat is from NASA officials, who, despite the many bad experiences with Mir and the ample evidence that Russia's space program is teetering, remain in denial about the dangers Russian participation poses for both the space station and the American astronauts who will live there.
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To: The Wall Street Journal
Fr: Mr. Christopher J. Faranetta;
Deputy Managing Director, American Operations
Re: Reply to Oberg Lies
Date: June 16, 1998
I would like to address some of the claims raised in Mr. Oberg's Wall Street Journal letter of June 12,1998:
Readers of the Wall Street Journal need to understand that there is the "truth" and then there is Mr. Oberg's "truth".
1. His claim that the Shuttle/Mir (Phase I) lessons are inapplicable to the International Space Station program (ISS) is completely unfounded, and here is one reason why. Prior to Phase I NASA astronauts merely visited space for a maximum of just over two weeks. Phase I allowed NASA and its astronauts to understand what it is like to actually live in space and truly experience the ups and downs of life aboard a real space station not a computer simulation.
2. It is just a plain lie that Russian manned space technology is outdated. >From the launch of Sputnik, Russian space technology has followed an evolutionary design and development approach, which has allowed the Russians to develop robust, reliable space systems. The lack of space system complexity is by design not by fault, to increase reliability, provide ease of maintenance and reduce overall program costs. The bottom line is that for missions in Earth orbit, one does not need to use cutting-edge, gold-plated space technology.
The Service Module and the Functional Energy Block now named Zarya (Sunrise) contain technology and systems that have been refined and evolved since the 1970's. This common-sense incremental engineering approach is also used in the production of automobiles, aircraft, submarines, computers and just about every other major technology in use today. Design heritage is the reason why both of the Russian made modules are key initial elements in the International Space Station.
Beyond the positive and negative experiences gained in using space flight-proven Russian technology, NASA now more fully comprehends the major differences between flying a Space Shuttle fleet and operating a space station.
3. Mr. Oberg plays bait and switch concerning the shrinking size of the Russian space program. To give an example, in 1989 prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, RSC Energia was a government organization of 65,000 employees who mostly worked on the Energia/Buran Space Shuttle and other space military programs. The gradual normalization of relations with the U.S., the collapse of the Soviet Union and difficulties with the Russian economy has caused the cancellation of these programs. Today, RSC Energia is a private corporation of 22 thousand people. The company is primarily focused on commercial unmanned and manned space programs. Additionally, to prevent the graying of its work force, RSC Energia recently made major changes in its management by promoting younger staff to program management positions.
4. On the false claim that the Russians are unable to develop anything ^Ónew^Ô, one only needs to look at the Sea Launch venture -- a project conceived by RSC Energia.
Furthermore, in manned space systems it should be noted that the 10 successful dockings and nine undockings of the Space Shuttle, Docking Module and Mir all used a new piece of Russian space technology. With the Shuttle weighing approximately 100 metric tons and Mir weighing 140 metric tons, docking is a potentially hazardous procedure. To minimize risk the spacecraft docked using a new Russian high-load docking system called APAS-89. To date few have noted that this piece of critical Russian developed space hardware worked without any problems during the entire life of the Phase I program.
5. Regarding the issue of Russia owing money to the government of Kazakhstan for the use of the Baikonur Cosmodrome, Mr. Oberg neglected to mention the billions of dollars owed by Kazakhstan to Russia. He also neglected to mention that the current commander of the Mir Space Station, Talgat A. Musabaev, is a Kazakh. This is proof that Kazakhstan has a vested interest in maintaining space operations at Baikonur and continuing joint space work with Russia.
6. Mr. Oberg also chooses to mislead Wall Street Journal readers with his claims of corruption. The three-story brick mansions in Russia do exist. However where is the proof that these homes were built with misused space funds?
Again, if Per Diem payments are being taken from Russian specialists, where is the proof? Who are the victims? Who took the money?
I have checked with Russian space officials in Houston, Texas and Moscow, Russia. Both vehemently deny Mr. Oberg^Òs claims about per diem being taken from Russian specialists. In fact the senior official in Moscow also added that,"if a boss were to be caught stealing per diem, he would no longer have a job". It is indeed unacceptable that the Russian government has not fully funded their contribution to the International Space Station, after promising many times to do so.
About $100 million U.S. Dollars is needed to complete the Service Module, which is the next generation of the Mir Space Station core module a space proven space station.
If the Russians deserve criticism it should be directed at not fully funding their contribution to ISS not false issues!
Christopher J. Faranetta
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Now it's my turn again (Oberg writing now). I would like to make a point-by-
point response to Energia-USA's arguments.
1. Energia-USA: "His claim that the Shuttle/Mir (Phase I) lessons are inapplicable to the International Space Station program (ISS) is completely unfounded.... Phase I allowed NASA and it^Òs astronauts to understand what it is like to actually live in space and truly experience the ups and downs of life aboard a real space station not a computer simulation."
Oberg had written: "By having astronauts on Mir, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration has learned much about the finer points of long-term continuous manned operations aboard space stations. Many things intended for use on the new station-- from procedures to actual hardware -- have been tested on Mir. And space workers at the Johnson Space Center in Houston have forged strong personal bonds with their opposite numbers in Russia. These are truly useful results." This doesn't sound like Oberg was arguing that Shuttle- Mir lessons about long-term operations were inapplicable -- just the opposite.
Oberg DID argue that "NASA remains tightly focused on the specific technical lessons learned from the Mir expeditions. [But] ... most of what happened on Mir just can't happen on the new space station, scheduled for final assembly in 2003, since its technology is decades ahead of Mir's. This means that most of what WILL go wrong on the International Space Station will have no warning precursors aboard Mir." It is this issue of the inapplicability of specific technical issues from Mir to ISS that Energia-USA appears to have totally misunderstood.
2. Energia-USA states that "it is just a plain lie that Russian manned space technology is outdated," yet their letter then goes on to give reasons why it is not such a bad thing to have older designs in current vehicles: "The bottom line is that for missions in Earth orbit, one does not need to use cutting- edge, gold-plated space technology." But direct quotations from Moscow Mission Control directors and from Mir cosmonauts themselves specified that many of the current Mir operational problems are due exactly to the fact that key systems (such as the Motion Control Computer) are years out of date even by Russian standards. Rather than suspect that Russian officials in Moscow are ALSO lying, perhaps Energia-USA spokesmen are confused and misinformed.
3. Energia-USA writes that "Mr. Oberg plays bait and switch concerning the shrinking size of the Russian space program", but it is unclear to Mr. Oberg what this phrase is supposed to mean. He had written that "the Russian teams have been decimated by loss of experienced personnel" while "few replacements have been recruited and trained", and Energia-USA wrote in response that their own organization had dropped from 65,000 employees to 22,000 employees, which supposedly somehow proved Mr. Oberg wrong.
4. Energia-USA referred to "the false claim that the Russians are unable to develop anything 'new'... and refuted it with the Sea-Launch example. While there is no reason to suspect that this program won't work -- it is being managed by Boeing, and Energia engineers hardly invented the concept of launching rockets from ships -- it still is only another Russian promise of what WILL happen in the future. Such promises most commonly are heard from people who don't want to talk about their actual performance in the recent past.
5. Energia-USA argues that Russia is justified in not paying money to Kazakstan, even though it signed a treaty to do so, for the lease and utilities at the Baykonur Cosmodrome, since Kazakstan already owes Russia money. This is a hypocritical line of reasoning, since while Russia has run up about $135 BILLION in foreign debts (according to the Russian parliament), Energia-USA still would insist on NASA paying IT the money that the US space agency agreed to, for hardware and services. As for debts between Kazakstan and Russia, the diplomats are still working on that one, especially on Kazakstan's raising the question of tens of billions of dollars in demanded reparations for the Soviet-era poisoning of vast areas of their country (including the region around Baykonur) with radiation, pesticides, and industrial wastes.
6. Energia-USA wrote that "Mr. Oberg also chooses to mislead Wall Street Journal readers with his claims of corruption. The three-story brick mansions in Russia do exist. However where is the proof that these homes were built with misused space funds?"
But if you read Mr. Oberg's paragraph on the houses, he in fact does not make any accusations: "Meanwhile, NASA does not want to talk about the three story brick mansions built by top cosmonaut officials at the Star City training base near Moscow. 'What Russia does with its own money is none of our business', a NASA spokesman told 'Nightline' last year. When one Russian general was confronted in Houston by a television news crew asking about how he could afford such a house on his official salary, NASA revoked the journalists' press passes." Energia-USA appears hyper-sensitive to the reasonable suspicions of outside observers, and has not provided any plausible source for the money EXCEPT 'misused space funds'.
IN CONCLUSION: The overwrought and off-target Energia-USA letter and the "liar liar" labels it throws around do not contribute to clarification of this controversy.
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